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Profit
Abstract
The banking industry in the United States has held many forms and has faced differing su pervision and
regulation, especially during the past decade. Beginning in 1991 with the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), then the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, and the Financial Modernization
Act (FMA) of 1999, the United States banking structure has undergone several key systematic changes.
The rationale for these changes was to accelerate the trend towards a financial system that is more
integrated in terms of activities and products. However, there is much debate over these improvements
and their effects on bank behavior in regards to risk taking, concentration of power, and the safety of
consumers’ monies.
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Before and After the FDICIA:
A Look into Commercial Banking Risk Behavior and Profit
By Lisa Birr
I. INTRODUCTION

T

he banking industry in the United States has
held many forms and has faced differing su
pervision and regulation, especially during the
past decade. Beginning in 1991 with the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA), then the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, and
the Financial Modernization Act (FMA) of 1999, the
United States banking structure has undergone several
key systematic changes. The rationale for these
changes was to accelerate the trend towards a financial
system that is more integrated in terms of activities
and products. However, there is much debate over
these improvements and their effects on bank behavior
in regards to risk taking, concentration of power, and
the safety of consumers’ monies.
The purpose of my research will be to focus on
the passage of one particular regulation change and
evaluate its effectiveness. The specific regulation that
I will be reviewing is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). In particular, I will review the relationships of pre-FDICIA
banking structure, post-FDICIA banking structure,
and their effects on bank behavior and profits. Using
balance sheet characteristics, risk behaviors, and other
characteristics of banks, I will create a model to help
predict if the banking behavior spawned by the new
regulation is beneficial to society. This paper will explore the determinants of the changes in banking risk
behavior and whether they increase or decrease
banks’ profits.
Section Two will provide historical background
information describing the creation and need for the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) after the Great Depression and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
after the banking debacle of the 1980s. Section Three
will then provide a review of previous research done

on the impact and effectiveness of the FDICIA on
the banking industry. A theoretical model will be created and discussed in Section Four followed by an
empirical model in Section Five. The results of the
empirical model will be presented in Section Six, and
future implications of the study will be presented in
Section Seven.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Great Depression of the late 1920s and early
1930s caused financial chaos in America, but one of
its enduring legacies was the creation of deposit insurance for financial intermediaries. When the stock
market crashed in October of 1929, there was no
regulation separating financial markets as there is today. The markets were linked, thus, when the securities market crashed the commercial banking sector
felt the ripples. The American people were scared to
hold their monies in banks for fear that the banks
would lose the money and they would not be able to
withdraw their own funds. This fear created bank
runs and caused more than 9,000 bank failures between the stock market crash in October of 1929
and March of 1933 (FDIC website, 1999). For all
practical purposes, the nation’s banking system had
shut down completely and thus desperately needed
help and restructuring. Among the actions taken by
Congress to bring order to the system was the separation of the financial markets, including the creation
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
in June of 1933. The intent of this legislation was to
provide a federal government guarantee of deposits
so that customers’ funds, within certain limits, would
be safe and available to them on demand. The coverage per depositor was set at a maximum of $2,500,
and all Federal Reserve member banks were required
to join. Today, the “heart of the FDIC’s mission is to
maintain stability and public confidence in the nation’s

The Park Place Economist / vol. IX

83

Lisa Birr
financial system” (FDIC website, 1999).
From the 1930’s through the 1970’s the FDIC’s
insurance of commercial banks and mutual savings
banks appeared to be an unqualified success. Bank
failures declined, no panics occurred, banks were more
profitable, and the insurance fund grew. Between
1943 and 1981, the FDIC collected more income
from the insurance premiums charged to banks than it
needed to pay off depositors in failed institutions. In
1983, however, insurance losses began to exceed
assessment revenue as 43 banks failed. By the end
of the decade more than 1,000 had failed, and in 1991
the FDIC projected for the first time a negative net
worth of $7 billion for the fund (Khademian, 1996).
In late 1990 and early 1991, the outlook for the banking industry, and even for the federal deposit insurance fund that backs most of its deposits, was especially bleak. Several analysts, agencies, and the federal government itself warned that the large number
and size of bank failures would exhaust the resources
of the FDIC. At the same time, the stock market had
severely discounted the share prices of most large
banks well below their book value.
It was in this environment that in early 1991 the
Senate and House Banking Committee each introduced bills calling for major deposit insurance reform.
In the end, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) was created. The
FDICIA represented the final legislative response to
the thrift debacle and regional banking problems of
the 1980s. This statute enacted needed reforms to
the system of bank supervision and regulation and to
federal deposit insurance. Much of the act was designed both to curb the incentives that deposit insurance gives to weakly capitalized insured banks to take
excessive risks, and to limit the cost of failures to the
FDIC. The primary purpose of the legislation was to
provide the bank insurance fund with a $30 billion
line of credit, but it also took an important step toward limiting the discretion exercised by bank examiners and supervisors to assess the condition of banks
and bring enforcement actions against problem banks
(Khademian, 1996).
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
When the FDICIA of 1991 was passed, many
bankers denounced it as the epitome of regulatory
84

The Park Place Economist / vol. IX

burden. In initial reviews of the legislation, the
FDICIA was not looked upon favorably: “It is viewed
by bankers as unnecessarily overreactive to the
industry’s troubles, as having injected the regulatory
body deeply into the management of the banks, removing regulatory managerial discretions and replacing it with formulas for regulatory action” (Weintraub,
1993). The passage of the FDICIA is argued to do
nothing in terms of bettering industry efficiency and
competitiveness. Many claim it will generate efficiency
losses that originate from the regulations adopted to
counter the distorted and negative incentives at work
in the financial system (Hoskins, 1993).
Glauber (1993) feels that the final rendition of
the FDICIA that was passed has negative aspects.
He argues that Congress greatly added to the burden
of excessive regulatory management and paperwork
reporting. He disputes that the greatest defect of the
FDICIA is the omission of the structural reforms that
are essential if banks are to be competitive in modern
financial times. If the banking industry is to achieve
long-run competitive viability, it will have to play a
more effective role in support of its own interests.
However, a decade has past and many studies
state that depository institutions have in fact prospered
since the FDICIA’s enactment. Kaufman (1994)
found that two problems existed in the 1980s that the
FDICIA sought to correct. First, deposit insurance
permitted regulators to keep troubled and even insolvent institutions in operation in order to avoid public
criticism of their performance. Second, underpriced
and flat-premium deposit insurance encouraged institutions to take risks both through the reduction of their
capital and the increase of the interest rate, and creation of exposures of their asset and liability portfolios. Kaufman deems that bank regulators who opposed the act weakened the impact of the FDICIA
by imposing and changing specific regulations in the
act. However, even in its weakened form, Kaufman
believes the FDICIA has both helped to make the
banking industry financially healthier and changed the
behavior of the regulators.
Richard Scott Carnell, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Financial Institutions, states that the percentage of commercial banks reporting net losses
plummeted by two-thirds, while aggregate commercial bank net income rose to set new records from
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1992 to 1995. He acknowledged that by 1997, commercial banks’ return on assets had more than doubled
since 1991 and the return on equity rose to 14.4% in
1996 from 7.94% in 1991 (Treasury Defends FDICIA
Bank Reform, 1997). This is a positive indication for
the FDICIA. However, not all of the assessments
may be attributed to the regulation change, but could
be due, in part, to the economic recovery of the U.S.
after the recession of 1990.
In a more recent study, Benston and Kaufman
(1998) conclude that under FDICIA, deposit insurance appears to have been put on a more workable
incentive-compatible basis that should reduce the tendency for banks to take excessive risks and for regulators to unduly delay imposing sanctions on financially troubled institutions. They argue that there is
additional capital being raised by banks above that
required by law in the FDICIA, and this is a driving
factor in the improvement of the banking industry. It
is not clear whether this additional capital would have
occurred with or without the FDICIA, but it does
indicate that banks may be becoming more risk adverse and less prone to fail, and this is being positively reflected on the FDICIA.
Overall, the majority of the reviews have been
positive. Previous literature has used differing measures of the effectiveness of the FDICIA, including
risk measures, asset measures, and liability measures.
It is the goal of this study to incorporate all of these
measures to determine if the passage of the FDICIA
did positively impact the banking industry.
IV. THEORETICAL MODEL
This paper argues that the enactment of the
FDICIA not only improved the stability of the banking sector by reducing risk incentives, but also improved banks’ profitability, which is beneficial to society. In theory, a bank’s exposure to risk should
have an impact on its holdings and profitability. In
general, risks are very subjective and can either create a profit or a loss. Financial theory states that the
greater the risk, the greater the return; this means that
an opportunity with a higher risk should have a higher
return because the chances of the opportunity failing
is greater. For example, a “junk” bond would pay a
higher interest rate than a bond rated AAA because it
has a greater chance of defaulting. The purpose of

the FDICIA is to curb the risk-taking behavior that
was seen in the past, particularly in the 1980s. However, as stated earlier, the purpose of this paper is
prove that the FDICIA is beneficial by decreasing
risk taking behaviors and increasing banks’ profitability.
In this case, risky behaviors were curbed, but returns
increased, which contradicts basic financial theory.
Before the enactment of the FDICIA, bank examiners scolded problem banks, but hardly ever punished them; in other words, they did not enforce policy
and behavior changes. Thus, banks continued to participate in risky behaviors. Some banks benefited
from this behavior and increased profits, but many
lost and caused bank failures. In general, prior to the
enactment of the FDICIA, banks that were incurring
losses were hard to reprimand because of FDIC protections, leading to an industry that was less profitable overall. The FDICIA curbed this behavior by
limiting the discretion of bank supervisors and examiners and bringing greater enforcement against problem banks. Thus, those problem banks were forced
to change their risky behaviors and become more risk
averse. This change decreased the probability of
losses and bank failures, which is then reflected in an
increase of profits in the industry.
The idea of a more controlled regulation and
structure leads to better organization and a better-run
business or industry. The initial idea behind the rules
and regulations set up in the FDIC of 1933 was to
prevent the terrible losses of the Great Depression
from ever occurring again and to improve banks’ profits so losses wouldn’t occur. Thus, the basic theory
behind the FDICIA is the same as that in 1933: to
improve the industry and society through better regulation.
In order to determine the impact of the FDICIA,
banks’ profits will be measured. In theory, profits are
a function of balance sheet characteristics (capital,
liabilities, and assets) and of risk behaviors (credit
risk). Furthermore, profits will vary according to other
characteristics, such as management quality and liquidity. I discuss each of these characteristics below.
A. Balance Sheet Characteristics
1. Capital
Capital, in broad terms, is the accumulated
wealth of a company. Under the FDICIA banks are
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required to hold a minimum amount of capital, which
is used to protect against losses. The amount held is
a percentage based on the risk embedded in their
asset holding. Therefore, banks with relatively risky
assets will hold a higher amount of capital than those
banks with less risky assets. However, many banks
maintain a higher level of capital than required by law
to hedge the risk of default from customers. They
wish to avoid any potential loss that comes from being undercapitalized, which was the cause of many
bank losses in the 1980s, and maintain a positive balance income. Since the reasoning behind high levels
of capital can differ between banks because of risk
exposure or avoidance, the direction of the relationship between capital and bank profitability is ambiguous.
2. Liabilities: Deposits
A liability in general is an amount owed. For
commercial banks, a liability is a deposit or other
borrowing they receive from individuals and businesses to be held at the bank, but are withdrawn from
the bank at the individual’s request. A large amount
of deposits would indicate that a bank has a large
liability and must be able to return the money deposited. However, a large amount of deposits may also
indicate that the bank is well managed and profitable.
Therefore, the relationship between liabilities and profitability is ambiguous and may be better viewed in
relation to assets.
3. Assets: Securities and Loans/Leases
An asset is the opposite of liability and is an
amount held or receivable. For commercial banks,
an asset is mainly a security or a loan/lease. A security is a financial asset including any note, bond, debenture, certificate of interest, and certificate of deposit. A loan and/or lease is money lent at interest for
a borrower’s temporary use under the terms that it
will be paid back. In theory, a large amount of assets
would indicate that a bank is large and resourceful
and able to handle risks better in order to be profitable. However, a large amount of assets may indicate
that those larger banks can afford to take larger risks.
Another ambiguous relationship is predicted; in this
case, between assets and profitability.
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B. Risk Exposure
Credit Risk Exposure -Asset Quality
Credit risk, or default risk, is a risk that a company or individual will be unable to pay the contractual interest or principal on its debt obligations, such
as loans. Loans are assets for a bank, but there exists the chance that a customer will default and not be
able to pay back the loan. Thus the bank loses the
asset. To control for this risk each bank must maintain an allowance for loan and lease losses that is adequate to absorb estimated credit losses associated
with its loan and lease portfolio. A bank with relatively risky assets will be required to maintain a larger
loan loss reserve account.
Loans are considered non-current if they are 90
days or more past due. Thus a bank with a high level
of non-current loans would be considered risky. A
riskier loan portfolio may be an indication of
management’s partiality for or mismanagement of risk
that may be reflected in profits. It can be argued that
investors and consumers would view a bank with a
relatively high loan loss reserve or a bank with a relatively high balance of non-current loans as one of high
risk (Hundman, 1999). A bank might have a difficult
time keeping its assets and capital level high to manage this risk, which would then reflect in a loss of
profits. Therefore, the direction of the relationship
between profits and bank credit is inverse.
C. Other Characteristics
1. Management Quality
The quality of the management of a bank will
determine the risks it takes and how stringent the bank
is on following the rules and guidelines set up by the
law. If there is a wide range of fluctuations and disorganization within management, the bank’s profits will
suffer. A bank whose management mishandles its
capital, assets, liabilities, and its exposure to varying
risks is expected to fail or suffer incredible losses.
On the other hand, a well-organized management will
follow rules and guidelines so that the bank is profitable and beneficial to consumers and society. Therefore, the higher the quality of the management, the
more profitable a bank will be.
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2. Liquidity
Liquidity is how easily an asset can be converted
to cash in the market. An asset with low liquidity can
be considered risky. If there is a fluctuation in the
market and a bank wishes to cash in on some of its
assets, it may have a difficult time depending on the
liquidity of the asset it wants to pull. Therefore, the
more liquid an asset, the better in terms of a bank’s
profit. However, having all highly liquid assets may
deplete profits because it gives off a signal to customers that a bank does not have financing for the long
term and may need quick cash. Therefore, a moderate level of liquidity is profitable. Because of this, a
positive relationship is predicted between liquidity and
profits up to some level.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In order to prove that the FDICIA has improved
the banking sector, a comparison of descriptive values will be done. Using data collected from before
and after the enactment of the FDICIA this section
analyzes bank regulation changes on bank characteristics, risk behaviors, and profit. The independent
variables are balance sheet characteristics, risk behaviors, and other characteristics. The dependent
variable is bank profit. Therefore profit will be viewed
as a function of these qualities:
Profit = f (balance sheet, risk, other)

The dependent variable, profit, will be measured
as return on assets (ROA), which measures net income after taxes and extraordinary items as a percent of average total assets. The independent variables, which are described earlier and in Table 1 include: total equity capital, total liabilities, total assets,
loss allowance to loans, and non-current loans to
loans.
Management quality and liquidity are two independent variables that have to be dropped from the
theoretical model because of data constraints. Management quality is subjective with no real means for
measurement. Therefore, the variable must be
dropped from the empirical model. However, management quality is still important to the research problem and should still be considered when banks are
evaluated. A measurement for liquidity, such as the
amount of short-term or long-term loans, could not
be found with the selected data set and so must be
dropped. Like management quality, this is still an important factor to look at when reviewing the profitability and risk behaviors of a bank.
This model will review the effectiveness of the
FDICIA by reviewing the changes in the independent
variables in relation to the dependent variable in two
time spans. It is predicted that although the FDICIA
imposed more stringent regulation to curb risky behaviors by commercial banks, it also increased profitability. The empirical model for pre-FDICIA and
post-FDICIA is based on pooled time series, cross

Table 1: Independent Variable Definitions and Relationship to Dependent Variable (ROA)
ROA
Re lations hip

Characte ris tic Variable

De finition

Balance
She e t
Balance
She e t
Balance
She e t

Capital

total equity capital (includes preferred and common
stock, surplus and undivided profits)

?

Liabilities

total liabilities (deposits and other borrowings)

?

Cre dit Ris k
Cre dit Ris k

total assets (cash, loans, securities, bank premises and
other assets)
Loss Allowance allowance for loan and lease losses as a percent of total
to Loans
loan and lease financing receivables
Assets

Non- Current
loans and leases 90 days or more past due plus loans in
Loans to Loans non- accrual status, as a percent of gross loans and leases

?
-
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sectional quarterly data. Post-FDICIA data is composed of 46 banks for the period 1996:IV to 1998:I.
A total of 276 cases were observed. There was an
availability constraint for pre-FDICIA data (data from
the late 1980s) so a proxy had to be used. The earliest data readily attainable was for 1992:IV and
1993:IV. This data set will be used as a substitute for
the pre-FDICIA data, given the idea that the regulation changes from the FDICIA are not felt right away,
but after an amount of time has passed. The sample
size for pre-FDICIA is composed of 46 banks for
two quarters. A total of 92 cases were observed.
Although the data sets differ in sample size, I predict
that they will still give informative descriptives results.
The data was taken from the Institutional Directory
System of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which provides financial information on
banks based on quarterly Call Reports. The sample
banks are diversified geographically and by asset size,
with all banks holding over one million dollars in assets by 1996.
VI. RESULTS
The descriptives tests of pre-FDICIA data and
post-FDICIA data are informative and did prove my
hypothesis correct. In comparing the two time periods, the mean value of ROA and all the balance sheet
characteristics (capital, liabilities, and assets) turned
out to be positive - that is these variables increased
from pre-FDICIA to post-FDICIA (table 2 and table
3). Also, the mean value of the two risk measures,
loss allowance to loans and non-current loans to loans,
decreased over time. This shows that the FDICIA
was successful in lowering the average of risk taking

behavior.
ROA is one of the most important variables and
should be looked at more closely. I predicted that
the FDICIA increased profits seen by banks, and by
reviewing ROA we can see that this indeed happened.
Not only did the maximum value of ROA increase
dramatically, but so did its mean value. The mean
value of ROA increased from 1.13 to 1.46, which is
a considerable increase of 29%.
Another important variable is capital. One purpose of the FDICIA was to raise the capital requirements held by commercial banks, and thus capital is a
variable that needs to be examined more closely. It is
obvious by reviewing the maximum level of capital
for all banks that the FDICIA did in fact have a positive effect on the level held. The amount of capital
held in the earlier data set reached a maximum level
of $176,276,000, whereas, the amount held in the
later data set reached a maximum of $6,036,457,000.
Also, the mean value of capital increased by
$338,286,000, which is an 11% increase. However,
the standard deviation of this variable also rose considerably, indicating that many of the banks in the data
set held a greater number of differing amounts of capital
after the passage of the FDICIA.
Also, the risk measures proved an important
point. Moving from the pre-FDICIA data set to the
post-FDICIA data set, both variables decreased. The
mean value of loss allowance to loans decreased from
1.89% to 1.86% and the mean value of non-current
loans to loans decreased from 1.48% to 1.14%.
These new values for loss allowance to loans and noncurrent loans to loans do not seem to deviate much
from the original values, but they amount to a -2%

Table 2: Pre-FDICIA Descriptive Statistics
Variable

M aximum M e an

Std. De viation

ROA
Capital*
Liabilitie s *

14.71
176276
1752154

1.13
30353
349006

1.13
27868.7 9
305179.19

As s e ts *
1928430
Los s Allowance to Loans
4.97
Non-Curre nt Loans to Loans 8.17

379360
1. 8 9
1. 4 8

332080.0 1
0.8 5
1.78

*measured in dollar amounts (000)
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Table 3: Post-FDICIA Descriptive Statistics

Variable
ROA
Capital*
Liabilitie s *
As s e ts *
Los s Allowance to Loans
Non-Curre nt Loans to Loans

M aximum
35.63
6036457.00
64083419.00
69707864.00
11.32
6.80

M e an
1.46
3 6 8 6 39
3741734
4323716
1. 8 6
1.14

Std. De viation
2 . 78
1266975.22
13301970.18
14998127.80
1.47
1.17

*measured in dollar amounts (000)

and -30% change, respectively.
Overall, the descriptives tests for both data
sets proved to be very informative and have shown
that the regulation change has influenced the variables
considerably.
VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of the descriptives tests prove my
hypothesis correct: that the FDICIA was beneficial
to the banking industry and society. It was predicted
that the FDICA did change bank characteristics and
risk behaviors, and the comparison of the two data
sets illustrates this. ROA and the balance sheet characteristics increased and the risk measures decreased.
Thus, the results proved my hypothesis that the regulatory changes proposed by the FDICIA were effective in their ultimate goals: lowering risk-taking behaviors by commercial banks, but also increasing the
profits seen by banks.
The increase in ROA over the time span 1992
to 1998 indicates that bank profitability has increased
since the inception of the FDICIA and so has the level
of capital held by the commercial banks. The higher
level of capital suggests that fewer banks are undercapitalized and are able to handle market fluctuations
and risks better and are not subject to failing easily.
Again, these results lead me to believe that my hypothesis is correct given the data proxies for preFDICIA.
The banking industry is part of everyone’s lives
in one way or another; thus this subject should be
reviewed extensively. It would be interesting to see
how big an impact the FDICIA had by reviewing the

post-FDICIA data set I gathered to one gathered
during the 1980s before the passage of the act. I
believe that this would further indicate that profits increased and risk-taking behavior decreased. Also,
risk is a very subjective instrument and it would be
interesting to evaluate the changes in banking behavior by looking at several other measures for risk-taking behavior. If the omitted variable had a way to be
measured it would be interesting to see the effect that
the FDICIA had on them as well. Another option for
future research would be the inclusion of GDP. This
would help control for business cycles and economic
booms and recessions, or lack there of, during the
two data sets. It would be particularly important in
the post-FDICIA data set since the U.S. economy
experienced a recession in 1990, just before the enactment of the FDICIA.
Regardless of these possible improvements in
the research project and design, the results indicate
that the inception of the FDICIA was effective. A
major conclusion of this research is that a more controlled regulatory system is better for the banking industry and thus a continued careful monitoring of the
industry always needs to be in place.
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